University of Pennsylvania

ScholarlyCommons
Finance Papers

Wharton Faculty Research

2002

Investing in Equity Mutual Funds
Ľuboš Pástor
Robert F. Stambaugh
University of Pennsylvania

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/fnce_papers
Part of the Finance Commons, and the Finance and Financial Management Commons

Recommended Citation
Pástor, Ľ., & Stambaugh, R. F. (2002). Investing in Equity Mutual Funds. Journal of Financial Economics,
63 (3), 351-380. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0304-405X(02)00065-X

This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/fnce_papers/365
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu.

Investing in Equity Mutual Funds
Abstract
We construct optimal portfolios of equity funds by combining historical returns on funds and passive
indexes with prior views about asset pricing and skill. By including both benchmark and nonbenchmark
indexes, we distinguish pricing-model inaccuracy from managerial skill. Modest confidence in a pricing
model helps construct portfolios with high Sharpe ratios. Investing in active mutual funds can be optimal
even for investors who believe managers cannot outperform passive indexes. Optimal portfolios exclude
hot-hand funds even for investors who believe momentum is priced. Our large universe of funds offers no
close substitutes for the Fama-French and momentum benchmarks.

Disciplines
Finance | Finance and Financial Management

This journal article is available at ScholarlyCommons: https://repository.upenn.edu/fnce_papers/365

Investing in Equity Mutual Funds
by*
ÿ
Luboÿ
s Pástor
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Abstract
We construct optimal portfolios of equity funds by combining historical returns on
funds and passive indexes with prior views about asset pricing and skill. By including
both benchmark and nonbenchmark indexes, we distinguish pricing-model inaccuracy
from managerial skill. Even modest conÞdence in a pricing model helps construct
portfolios with high Sharpe ratios. Investing in active mutual funds can be optimal
even for investors who believe active managers cannot outperform passive indexes.
Optimal portfolios exclude hot-hand funds even for investors who believe momentum
is priced. Our large universe of funds oﬀers no close substitutes for the Fama-French
and momentum benchmarks.
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1.

Introduction

Selecting a portfolio of mutual funds involves a combination of data and judgment. Relying
solely on historical fund returns risks overinvesting in funds that have been lucky, especially
when funds have short track records. An investor seeking the highest Sharpe ratio can take
another extreme and simply combine a riskless investment with a market index fund, accepting completely the CAPM’s investment implication. That approach might also be viewed as
unappealing: it ignores any information in the data about the inevitable shortcomings of any
pricing model, be it the CAPM or another, and it avoids any consideration of evidence that
some managers might possess stock-picking skill. How can an investor combine information
in the returns data about pricing-model error and managerial skill with his prior judgment
about how important those considerations could be?
We develop and implement a framework in which prior views and empirical evidence
about pricing models and managerial skill can be incorporated formally into the investment decision. Our framework relies on a set of passive indexes or “assets,” consisting of
nonbenchmark assets as well as the benchmark assets prescribed by a pricing model. A
common interpretation of alpha, the intercept in a regression of the fund’s excess return on
the benchmarks, is that it represents the skill of the fund’s manager in selecting mispriced
securities. That interpretation is subject to a number of pitfalls, including a concern that
the benchmarks used to deÞne alpha might not price all passive investments.1 We allow an
investor to have prior beliefs about a skill measure that is instead deÞned as the intercept
in a regression of the fund’s return on our entire set of passive assets. At the same time, we
allow the investor to have prior beliefs about the potential mispricing of the nonbenchmark
assets with respect to the benchmarks. In other words, an investor can have prior beliefs
that distinguish managerial skill from pricing-model inaccuracy.
Evaluating mutual fund performance is a topic of long-standing interest in the academic
literature, but few if any studies have addressed the selection of an optimal portfolio of funds.
Instead of using the historical data to estimate performance measures or produce fund rankings, this study uses the data to explore the mutual-fund investment decision. SpeciÞcally,
from an investment universe of over 500 no-load equity funds, we construct portfolios having
the ex ante maximum Sharpe ratio based on a Bayesian predictive distribution that combines
the information in historical returns with an investor’s prior beliefs, accounting for parameter uncertainty. We entertain priors representing a range of beliefs about managerial skill
1

Other well-known complications include the possibility that the manager changes the fund’s beta through
time as conditional expected returns on the benchmarks ßuctuate.
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as well as the accuracy of each of three pricing models: the CAPM, the three-factor FamaFrench model, and the four-factor model of Carhart (1997). The last model supplements the
three Fama-French benchmarks with a “momentum” factor, the current month’s diﬀerence
in returns between the previous year’s best- and worst-performing stocks. Unlike the actual returns on mutual funds, a pricing model’s benchmark returns are generally computed
without deducting any of the costs associated with implementing the underlying investment
strategies. Therefore, while the zero-cost (hypothetical) returns on the passive benchmark
and nonbenchmark indexes are used in the modeling and estimation, only mutual funds are
assumed to be eligible for investment.
We Þnd that when the hypothetical benchmarks are recognized as being unavailable
for investment, there need not exist close substitutes for them in the universe of mutual
funds. For an investor who believes completely in the accuracy of the Fama-French model
and precludes managerial skill, the perceived maximum Sharpe ratio is only 66 percent of
what could be achieved by direct investment in that model’s benchmarks. For a believer
in the Carhart four-factor model, the corresponding value is 54 percent. Moreover, actively
managed funds can be better substitutes for the benchmarks than existing passive funds, so
active funds can be selected even by investors who admit no possibility of managerial skill.
On the other hand, we Þnd that a “hot-hand” portfolio of the previous year’s best-performing
mutual funds does not enter the optimal portfolio under any set of prior beliefs about skill or
mispricing we consider, even if the investor has complete conÞdence in the four-factor model
that includes a momentum factor as a benchmark.
We also demonstrate that optimal portfolios of mutual funds are inßuenced substantially
by prior beliefs about both managerial skill and pricing models. For example, consider two
investors who both rule out managerial skill but believe strongly in diﬀerent models: one
believes in the CAPM while the other embraces a four-factor model. If either investor is
forced to hold the portfolio of funds chosen by the other, the resulting ex ante loss is about
60 basis points per month in certainty equivalent return.2 A possibly ßawed pricing model is
still useful in identifying optimal portfolios because it allows the model’s benchmark assets
to supply information about the funds’ expected returns. Consider, for example, an investor
who rules out skill and whose prior 95% conÞdence interval for the diﬀerence between a
fund’s expected return and the CAPM-implied value is plus or minus 4% per annum. If
that investor is forced to hold the portfolio of funds chosen by an investor who makes no use
of a pricing model whatsoever, the certainty equivalent loss is 26 basis points per month.
2

The level of risk aversion is set to that of an investor who allocates 100 percent to a market index if the
investment universe contains only that index plus a riskless asset.
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Even for a “completely skeptical” investor who rules out the usefulness of pricing models as
well as skill by fund managers, the longer histories of returns on the passive assets provide
information about funds’ return moments that is valuable in the investment decision. The
importance of prior beliefs is demonstrated in ex post out-of-sample results as well. Over
the past twenty years, two investors with diﬀerent prior beliefs about either pricing models
or potential managerial skill would have experienced substantially diﬀerent returns on their
portfolios of mutual funds selected each year from the available universe.
This study, given its Bayesian approach, is related to the recent article by Baks, Metrick,
and Wachter (2001), who estimate funds’ alphas using informative prior beliefs about alpha.
They investigate the degree to which informative priors can preclude an investor from inferring that at least one actively managed fund has a positive alpha. This inference relates to
an investment problem of a mutual fund investor who can also earn the hypothetical costless
returns on the benchmark indexes. In that setting, if a given fund’s alpha is greater than
zero, then combining that fund with a position in the benchmarks produces a higher Sharpe
ratio than an investment in the benchmarks alone. Our study diﬀers from the important
contribution of Baks, Metrick, and Wachter (2001) in a number of ways, including that we (i)
construct portfolios of funds from the available universe, (ii) do not treat the benchmark returns as directly available for investment, and (iii) distinguish beliefs about the ability of the
benchmarks to price passive assets from beliefs about the potential skill of fund managers.
The remainder of the study proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the econometric
framework, Section 3 presents the results of the investment problem, and Section 4 brießy
reviews our conclusions.

2.

Framework and Methodology

Prior beliefs about pricing models can be useful to someone investing in mutual funds. A
pricing model implies that a combination of the model’s benchmark assets provides the
highest Sharpe ratio within a passive universe. That implication is useful to an investor
seeking a high Sharpe ratio, even if the investor has less than complete conÞdence in the
model’s pricing accuracy and cannot invest directly in the benchmarks. Prior beliefs about
managerial skill are also important in the investment decision. One investor might believe
completely in a model’s accuracy in pricing passive assets but believe active managers could
well possess stock-picking skill. Another investor might be skeptical about the ability of fund
managers to pick stocks as well as the ability of academics to build accurate pricing models.
3

This section develops an econometric framework that allows an investor to combine information in the data with prior beliefs about both pricing and skill. Nonbenchmark assets
allow us to distinguish between pricing and skill, and they supply additional information
about funds’ expected returns. In addition, nonbenchmark assets help account for common
variation in funds’ returns, making the investment problem feasible using a large universe
of funds. The Bayesian econometric framework here is very similar to that in Pástor and
Stambaugh (2001), who address performance estimation rather than investment decision
making. Consequently, they specify noninformative prior beliefs about the degree of skill a
fund manager might possess.

2.1.

Mispricing versus skill

Let rN,t denote the m×1 vector of returns in month t on m nonbenchmark passive assets, and
let rB,t denote the vector of returns on the k benchmark assets relevant to a given pricing
model. We use “returns” to denote rates of return in excess of a riskless interest rate or
payoﬀs on zero-investment spread positions. DeÞne the multivariate regression
rN,t = αN + BN rB,t + ²N,t ,

(1)

where the variance-covariance matrix of ²N,t is denoted by Σ. Also deÞne the regression of a
given fund’s return on all p (= m + k) passive assets,
rA,t = δA + c0AN rN,t + c0AB rB,t + uA,t ,

(2)

where the variance of uA,t is denoted by σu2 . All regression disturbances are assumed to be
normally distributed, independently and identically across t, and uncorrelated across funds.
In other words, we assume that the nonbenchmark assets account for covariance in fund
returns that is not captured fully by the benchmarks.
In both commercial and academic settings, much interest attaches to a fund’s alpha,
deÞned as the intercept αA in the regression
rA,t = αA + βA rB,t + ²A,t .

(3)

Alpha is often interpreted as skill displayed by the fund’s manager in selecting mispriced
securities, but a nonzero alpha need not reßect skill if some passive assets can also have
nonzero alphas. In that scenario, a manager could achieve a positive alpha in the absence
of any skill simply by starting a new fund that invests in nonbenchmark passive assets
4

with historically positive alphas. To address such concerns, one can expand the set of
benchmarks to include more passive assets, even to the point of including all assets available
to the manager. Indeed, as observed by Grinblatt and Titman (1989, p.412), “... the
unconditional mean-variance eﬃcient portfolio of assets that are considered tradable by the
evaluated investor provides correct inferences about the investor’s performance ... links
between performance measures and particular equilibrium models are not necessary.” Chen
and Knez (1996) adopt a similar approach in a conditional setting, in that they evaluate funds
with respect to a set of passive benchmarks selected without regard to a pricing model: “...we
argue that for application purposes, one does not need to rely on asset pricing models to
deÞne an admissible performance measure” (p. 515).
In practice, the number of passive assets must be limited in some fashion. Our empirical
design includes p passive assets, consisting of k benchmarks and m nonbenchmark assets,
and the benchmarks are associated with popular asset pricing models. Suppose one admits
the possibility that the benchmarks do not price the nonbenchmark assets exactly, that is
αN 6= 0. Then δA , the intercept in (2), is a better measure of skill, in that it is deÞned with
respect to the more inclusive set of passive assets. Of course, that measure might still be
nonzero for passive assets omitted from the set of p. The point is simply that inadequacy of
δA as a skill measure implies inadequacy of αA , whereas δA can be adequate when αA is not.
The skill measure δA is deÞned with respect to the overall set of p assets, but the investor
nevertheless Þnds it useful to partition that set into k benchmark and m nonbenchmark
assets. Even though the investor is unwilling to assume that the k benchmarks price the
nonbenchmark assets exactly, he might nevertheless believe that the benchmarks possess
some pricing ability. That pricing ability, albeit imperfect, helps the investor identify portfolios with high Sharpe ratios, as illustrated in Section 3.
The prior distributions for the parameters of the regressions in (1) and (2) are the same
as in Pástor and Stambaugh (2001), with the exception of the prior about managerial skill.
The prior for BN is diﬀuse, the prior for Σ is inverted Wishart, the prior for σu2 is inverted
gamma, and the prior for cA = (c0AN c0AB )0 , conditional on σu2 , is normal. The values for
the parameters of the prior distributions are speciÞed using an empirical Bayes procedure
described in Pástor and Stambaugh (2001).
Prior beliefs about pricing are speciÞed as follows. Conditional on Σ, the prior for αN is
normal,
1
(4)
αN |Σ ∼ N (0, σα2 N ( 2 Σ)),
s
5

where E(Σ) = s2 Im . Pástor and Stambaugh (1999) introduce the same type of prior for
a single element of αN , and Pástor (2000) and Pástor and Stambaugh (2000) apply the
multivariate version in (4) to portfolio-choice problems. The investor’s beliefs about pricing
are characterized by σαN , the marginal prior standard deviation of each element in αN .
Specifying σαN = 0 is equivalent to setting αN = 0, corresponding to perfect conÞdence in
the benchmarks’ pricing ability. A diﬀuse prior for αN corresponds to σαN = ∞. With a
nonzero Þnite value of σαN , prior beliefs are centered on the pricing restriction, but some
degree of mispricing is entertained. We refer to σαN as “mispricing uncertainty.”
Prior beliefs about managerial skill are speciÞed in a similar manner. Conditional on σu2 ,
the prior for δA is normal,
Ã
!
2
σ
u
δA |σu2 ∼ N(δ0 ,
σ 2 ).
(5)
E(σu2 ) δ
The conditional prior variance of δA is positively related to σu2 for a reason similar to that
given for the corresponding assumption in (4). If the variation in the fund’s return is explained well by that of the benchmarks, so that σu2 is low, then it is less likely that the fund’s
manager can achieve a large value for δA .
We assume that an investor selecting a portfolio of mutual funds generally has informative
prior beliefs about the fund managers’ ability to achieve a nonzero δA . Therefore, we set σδ2 ,
the marginal prior variance of δA , to Þnite values and specify δ0 as a function of the fund’s
costs. If a fund manager possesses no skill, then δA should simply reßect costs, since the
returns on the p passive assets used to deÞne δA have no costs deducted. To represent a
prior belief that precludes skill, we set σδ = 0 and specify
δ0 = −

1
(expense + 0.01 × turnover),
12

(6)

where expense is the fund’s average annual expense ratio and turnover is the fund’s average
annual reported turnover. Multiplying the latter quantity by 0.01 is equivalent to assuming
a round-trip cost per transaction of one percent, approximately the 95 basis points estimated
by Carhart (1997) for the average fund in his sample.3
When one admits some possibility of skill, the link between turnover and prior expected
performance becomes less clear. If the manager does possess skill, then high turnover is
3

Carhart obtains that estimate as the average slope coeﬃcient in monthly cross-sectional regressions of
fund return on “modiÞed” turnover, which includes transactions arising from contributions and withdrawals.
In forecasting future transactions, it seems reasonable to abstract from growth or shrinkage of the fund and
instead view a fund with either no sales or no purchases as a low-turnover fund. Thus, for the value of
turnover in equation (6) we use reported turnover, deÞned as the minimum of the fund’s purchases and sales
divided by its average total net assets.
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likely to be accompanied by positive performance. On the other hand, if the manager
possesses no skill, then high turnover can only hurt expected performance. If the investor is
uncertain about whether the manager has skill, that is if σδ > 0, then the relation between
expected turnover and expected performance is ambiguous. A similar ambiguity arises with
expense ratios. We follow an empirical Bayes approach in specifying how prior expected
performance depends on expense and turnover when σδ > 0.4 SpeciÞcally, we estimate a
1
1
cross-sectional regression of estimated δA on 12
expense and 12
turnover, where the estimate
of δA is the posterior mean obtained with σδ = ∞. Across a number of alternative methods

for including funds (e.g., minimum history length) and estimating the coeﬃcients (OLS or
1
expense is consistently about −1
weighted least squares), we Þnd that the coeﬃcient on 12
1
and is at least twice its standard error. In contrast, the coeﬃcient on 12
turnover ßuctuates
within an interval roughly between −0.005 and 0.005 and is generally less than its standard
error.5 Guided by this result, we specify
δ0 = −

1
expense
12

(7)

as the prior mean of δA when σδ > 0.
Our framework assumes that funds’ sensitivities to passive assets are constant over time.
One way of relaxing this assumption is to model these coeﬃcients as linear functions of
state variables, as for example in Ferson and Schadt (1996) and Shanken (1990). In such
a modiÞcation, passive asset returns scaled by the state variables can be viewed as returns
on additional passive assets (dynamic passive strategies), and the approach developed here
could be extended to such a setting. Another approach to dealing with temporal variation
in parameters could employ data on fund holdings. Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers
(1997) and Wermers (2000), for example, use such data in characteristic-based studies of
fund performance.
4

An alternative approach, proposed by Baks, Metrick, and Wachter (2001), is to specify a prior for
performance that is truncated below at a point that reßects expenses as well as an estimate of transactions
costs.
5
Wermers (2000) Þnds that turnover does not exhibit a signiÞcant relation to net performance after
adjusting for risk and asset characteristics.
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2.2.

Data and the investment problem

The mutual fund data come from the 1998 CRSP Survivor Bias Free Mutual Fund Database.6 , 7
Our initial sample contains 2,609 domestic equity mutual funds. We exclude multiple share
classes for the same fund as well as funds with only a year or less of available returns. The
initial sample is used to obtain the values of the prior parameters in the empirical Bayes procedure mentioned previously. To form the investment universe, we reduce the initial sample
of 2,609 funds to the 503 funds that (i) charge no load fee, (ii) exist at the end of 1998, (iii)
have at least 36 months of return history under the most recent manager, and (iv) have data
on expense ratios and turnover rates. We exclude funds that charge load fees simply because
it is not clear how to treat the payment of such fees within the single-period setting implicit
in maximizing the Sharpe ratio. For each fund we compute the monthly return in excess of
that on a one-month Treasury bill.
Our set of benchmark and nonbenchmark passive assets consists of the eight portfolios
used in Pástor and Stambaugh (2001). Monthly returns on all passive assets are available
over the period of July 1963 through December 1998. We specify up to four benchmark
series. The Þrst three consist of the factors constructed by Fama and French (1993), updated
through 1998: MKT, the excess return on a broad market index, and SMB and HML, payoﬀs
on long-short spreads constructed by sorting stocks according to market capitalization and
book-to-market ratio.8 The fourth series, denoted as MOM, is the “momentum” factor
constructed by Carhart (1997). When pricing-model beliefs are centered on the CAPM, then
SMB, HML, and MOM become three of the nonbenchmark series. Similarly, when beliefs
are centered on the Fama-French model, MOM is then one of the nonbenchmark series. Four
additional series are used as nonbenchmark returns with all three pricing models. The Þrst
of these, denoted as CMS, is the payoﬀ on a characteristic-matched spread in which the long
position contains stocks with low HML betas and the short position contains stocks with
high HML betas. The remaining three series are industry portfolios, denoted as IP1, IP2,
and IP3. Details on the construction of the passive assets, as well as the reasoning behind
choosing this particular set, are provided in Pástor and Stambaugh (2001).
Under various prior beliefs about skill and pricing, we construct portfolios with the highest
Sharpe ratio, deÞned as expected excess return divided by the standard deviation of return.
6

CRSP, Center for Research in Security Prices, Graduate School of Business, The University of Chicago
1999, crsp.com. Used with permission. All rights reserved.
7
We are grateful to Thomas Knox and the authors of Baks, Metrick, and Wachter (2001) for providing
us with a number of corrections to the CRSP Mutual Fund Database.
8
We are grateful to Ken French for supplying these data.
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The p passive assets used to deÞne δA are included in the econometric speciÞcation, but
since returns on those assets do not include any implementation costs, only the 503 no-load
mutual funds are assumed to be eligible for investment. In addition, short positions in funds
are precluded.
Let R denote the sample data, consisting of returns on passive assets and funds through
month T , and let rT +1 denote the vector of returns on the funds in month T +1. In solving the
investment problem, Sharpe ratios are computed using moments of the predictive distribution
of the funds’ returns,
Z
(8)
p(rT +1 |R) = p(rT +1 |R, θ) p(θ|R) dθ,
θ

where p(θ|R) is the posterior distribution of the parameter vector, θ.9 The Þrst two moments
of this predictive distribution are derived in the Appendix. The fund’s history is used only
back to the month beginning the most recent manager’s tenure, whereas the return histories
of the p passive assets begin in July 1963.
A meaningful investment universe can include only those funds that exist at the end of
the sample period, December 1998, but this selection criterion raises the issue of survival
bias. In particular, under prior beliefs that admit the possibility of skill (σδ > 0), one
might be concerned that the posterior mean of a manager’s skill measure δA is overstated
by a failure to condition on the fund’s having survived. Baks, Metrick, and Wachter (2001)
make the interesting observation that, if the priors for skill are independent across funds
(as we assume), and if a fund’s survival depends only on realized return histories, then the
posterior distribution of the parameters for the surviving funds is unaﬀected by conditioning
on their survival. In essence, the Bayesian posterior for the parameters conditions on the
return histories in any event, and those return histories subsume the information in knowing
the fund survived, if survival depends only on realized returns. Like Baks, Metrick, and
Wachter, we Þnd the latter view of survival to be plausible, and thus we proceed under that
assumption. (For additional discussion of this issue, see also Pástor and Stambaugh, 2001.)

3.

Investment results

Table 1 reports weights in the optimal portfolio for investors with various beliefs about
managerial skill and mispricing of passive assets under the CAPM. (The weights in each
9

Early applications of Bayesian methods to portfolio choice, using diﬀuse prior beliefs, include Zellner
and Chetty (1965), Klein and Bawa (1976), and Brown (1979). Recent examples, using informative priors,
include Pástor (2000) and Pástor and Stambaugh (2000).
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column of Panel A add to 100 percent.) For convenience, we refer throughout to a portfolio
having the highest ex ante Sharpe ratio within a given universe as “optimal.” Mispricing
uncertainty, σαN , is assigned values of zero, one percent, and two percent (per annum),
while skill uncertainty, σδ , is assigned values of zero, one percent, three percent, and inÞnity.
Tables 2 and 3 report corresponding results for two other pricing models, the Fama-French
three-factor model (Table 2) and the Carhart four-factor model (Table 3). Table 4 reports
optimal weights for σαN = ∞, in which case the investor makes no use of the pricing models.

3.1.

How unique are the selected funds?

In each of Tables 1 through 4, Panel B compares the optimal portfolios in Panel A to the
optimal portfolios constructed from universes of funds that exclude those in the original
portfolios. In other words, for each σα and σδ , the same optimization problem is solved a
second time, but the funds selected for the original portfolio are excluded from consideration.
From the perspective of an investor with a given set of prior beliefs, this comparison reveals
the extent to which there exist close substitutes for the funds selected originally. Panel B
reports the correlation between the original and alternative portfolio as well as the diﬀerence in certainty equivalent returns. The certainty-equivalent diﬀerence is computed for an
investor who maximizes the mean-variance objective,
1
(9)
Cp = Ep − Aσp2 ,
2
where EP and σp2 denote the mean and variance of the excess return on the investor’s overall
portfolio (including unrestricted riskless borrowing and lending). Risk-aversion, A, is set to
2.75, which is the level at which an investor would allocate 100% to the benchmark index
MKT if the investment universe contained just that single risky position in addition to
the riskless asset. The correlation and certainty equivalents are computed using the same
predictive distribution used in the portfolio optimization.
In some cases there are close substitutes for the original funds. For example, when
an investor believes completely in the CAPM and rules out managerial skill, the optimal
portfolio is a combination of market-index funds (Table 1, Þrst column). Not surprisingly,
our fund universe contains other index funds in addition to those selected, and thus the
alternative portfolio is highly correlated with the original and achieves a virtually identical
certainty equivalent.
In many other cases the funds originally selected are more unique. For example, an
investor with A = 2.75 who believes completely in the four-factor model and rules out skill
10

loses 25 basis points per month if forced to hold the alternative portfolio that excludes the
funds originally selected (Table 3, Þrst column). The correlation of that alternative portfolio
with the original is only 0.87. As will be discussed later, the original portfolio in that case is
heavily invested in real estate funds. An investor who believes completely in the Fama-French
model and rules out skill would select a portfolio that contains value-oriented funds as well
as some real estate funds (Table 2, Þrst column). If forced to choose an alternative portfolio,
that investor loses 9 basis points per month in certainty equivalent, and the alternative
portfolio has a correlation of 0.95 with the original. For larger values of σδ , or when no
pricing model is used, the certainty-equivalent diﬀerences from the original portfolios are
typically at least 20 basis points per month, and the correlations are about 0.93 or less.

3.2.

How important are beliefs about pricing models and skill?

We stated earlier that a pricing model, even if not believed completely, helps an investor
identify portfolios with high Sharpe ratios. Consider the CAPM, for example. For an investor
who believes completely in the CAPM and rules out skill, the ideal investment’s return is
perfectly correlated with the benchmark index return MKT. Indeed, as shown in Panel C
of Table 1, the portfolio of funds in the Þrst column essentially possesses that feature. A
value of σαN = 1% means that, before examining the data, the investor assigns about a
Þve percent probability to the prospect that the expected return on a given nonbenchmark
passive asset violates its CAPM prediction by more than 200 basis points per annum in
either direction. With that degree of mispricing uncertainty but the same belief about skill,
the optimal portfolio is still essentially composed of market index funds and has a correlation
with MKT that rounds to 1.00. With twice as much mispricing uncertainty (σαN = 2%),
the correlation with MKT is 0.89, which is still considerably higher than the value of 0.74
obtained when no pricing model is used (Table 4, Panel C, Þrst entry).
The CAPM continues to inßuence portfolio choice when the investor admits the possibility
of managerial skill. A value of σδ = 1% means that, before examining a given fund’s track
record, the investor assigns about a 2.5% probability to the prospect that the fund’s manager
generates a positive skill measure gross of expenses of at least 200 basis points per year. (Of
course, given the symmetry of our prior, the investor assigns the same probability to a
negative skill measure of that magnitude, but the left tail is unimportant with short sales
precluded.) With that amount of skill uncertainty, the CAPM can still help the investor
construct the portfolio with the highest Sharpe ratio, even with some uncertainty about
the CAPM’s ability to price passive assets. When σδ = 1%, the optimal portfolio has a
11

correlation of 0.92 with MKT when σαN = 2% (Table 1), as compared to a correlation of
only 0.76 when no model is used. With three times as much skill uncertainty (σδ = 3%), the
optimal portfolio’s correlation with MKT is 0.93 when σαN = 2% and 0.87 when the model
is not used. That is, even with a substantial degree of willingness to accept the possibility of
managerial skill and only modest conÞdence in the CAPM, the investor’s portfolio selection
is still inßuenced by the pricing model.
Note that, holding σαN constant, the correlation of the optimal fund portfolio with MKT
can increase or decrease as a function of σδ . When σδ = 0, funds are chosen primarily for
their exposures to passive assets. As σδ increases, more weight is put on the funds with
high realized returns, and those funds can be more or less correlated with MKT than the
funds chosen for σδ = 0. Panel C of Table 1 provides examples of both possibilities: the
correlations go up with σδ when σαN = 2%, but they go down with σδ when σαN = 0.
Portfolio choice is inßuenced by beliefs in the other pricing models in similar ways as
noted above for the CAPM. For an investor who believes completely in the Fama-French
model and rules out skill, the ideal investment, if available, would have a return perfectly
correlated with the combination of MKT, SMB, and HML having the highest Sharpe ratio.
As will be discussed below, a close substitute for such an investment is not available within
our fund universe, but a belief in that pricing model nevertheless plays a role in the selection
of funds. For example, the correlation between the portfolio in the Þrst column of Table 2
and the ideal combination of the three Fama-French factors is 0.75, whereas the portfolio
chosen with the same beliefs about skill but no use of a pricing model has a correlation of
only 0.66 with that same combination of the three factors (Table 4, Panel C). As before, the
pricing model continues to play a role in portfolio choice as one’s belief in it becomes less
than dogmatic (σα > 0) and the possibility of skill is entertained (σδ > 0).
Panel A of Table 5 compares portfolios formed with the same σαN and σδ but under
diﬀerent pricing models. In comparing portfolios obtained under diﬀerent speciÞcations, one
portfolio is designated as optimal and the other as suboptimal, where the suboptimal portfolio is optimal under the alternative speciÞcation. We compare the certainty equivalent for
the optimal portfolio, Co , to the certainty equivalent for a suboptimal portfolio, Cs . Both
certainty equivalents are computed using the predictive moments obtained under the prior
beliefs associated with the optimal portfolio. The diﬀerence between any two models ranges
between 1 and 61 basis points per month, depending on the prior uncertainty about mispricing and skill.10 In general, sample averages receive more weight in estimating expected
10

The reported certainty-equivalent diﬀerence is actually the average of two diﬀerences, one for each of the
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returns when one’s prior beliefs about pricing and skill become less informative. As mispricing uncertainty increases, the portfolios formed with beliefs centered on diﬀerent pricing
models become more alike: the certainty-equivalent diﬀerence drops and the correlation increases. An increase in skill uncertainty also tends to make the cross-model diﬀerence less
important, although not monotonically. The largest certainty-equivalent diﬀerences tend
to occur between the CAPM and the four-factor model when σαN and σδ are small. The
smallest diﬀerences occur between the Fama-French and four-factor models when σδ is large.
When σαN and σδ are both one percent or less, however, the certainty-equivalent diﬀerence
between those two models is at least 19 basis points per month.
In Panel B of Table 5, the optimal portfolio under a given set of beliefs about skill and
mispricing is compared to the portfolio selected by an investor who rules out any ability of
academics to build models and any skill of portfolio managers to pick stocks. The portfolio
of this “completely skeptical” investor, for whom σαN = ∞ and σδ = 0, is designated as
the suboptimal portfolio in computing the pairwise comparisons described previously. (Its
weights are given in the Þrst column of Table 4.) Suppose one forces that portfolio to be
held by an investor who has a modest degree of conÞdence in the CAPM, say σαN = 2%,
and who admits some possibility of managerial skill, say σδ = 1%. Then that investor suﬀers
a certainty-equivalent loss of 29 basis points per month, or about 3.5% per year. With
beliefs centered around the Fama-French model but again with σαN = 2% and σδ = 1%,
the certainty-equivalent loss falls to 15 basis points per month. When skill uncertainty is
one percent or less, complete belief in the four-factor model produces a portfolio quite close
to that obtained with no use of the model at all, with a certainty-equivalent diﬀerence of 6
basis points or less and a correlation of at least 0.97. As an investor’s willingness to accept
the prospect of managerial skill increases, so does the certainty-equivalent loss if forced to
hold the portfolio of the completely skeptical investor. With σδ = 3%, for example, the loss
is between 31 and 89 basis points per month with modest conÞdence (σαN = 2%) in one
of the three pricing models. With no use of a pricing model, the loss is 23 basis points, as
reported in Panel D of Table 4.
Even with no belief in a pricing model and no preconceived limit on the magnitude of
likely managerial skill, that is when both σαN and σδ are inÞnitely large, the investor is
generally ill-advised in using a fund’s historical average return as the input for its expected
two pricing models designated as producing the optimal portfolio. The correlation reported in Panel A is
similarly the average of two values, one for the predictive distribution associated with each model. Averaging
in this fashion treats the pricing models symmetrically, although generally the two values being averaged are
close to each other.
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return.11 If the fund’s history is shorter than those of the passive assets, then the histories of
the passive assets provide additional information about the fund’s expected return. Under
the above prior beliefs, the certainty-equivalent loss of holding the portfolio constructed
using sample averages instead of holding the portfolio constructed using that additional
information about expected returns is 187 basis points per month, or more than 22 percent
annually (Panel E of Table 4). The predictive covariance matrix obtained when σαN = ∞

and σδ = ∞ is used to construct both portfolios. As prior beliefs about pricing or skill
become informative, the loss incurred by holding the portfolio based on sample averages
becomes even greater, as is apparent in Panel C of Table 5. The magnitude of the loss is
ampliÞed by a leverage eﬀect. Unlike the portfolio of our Bayesian investor, the portfolio
of an investor who uses sample means is highly levered, since the latter investor borrows
heavily to invest in the funds with high realized returns. Note that while the diﬀerences in
leverage aﬀect the certainty equivalent loss, they have no eﬀect on the correlation between
the two portfolios.
Recall that prior beliefs about skill are centered at a value reßecting a fund’s costs.
The results appear to be fairly insensitive to this speciÞcation, in that setting δ0 to zero
instead of the negative values in (6) or (7) produces optimal portfolios (unreported) that
are generally very similar to those in Tables 1 through 4. A notable exception occurs with
dogmatic beliefs in the CAPM and no skill (σα = σδ = 0), where the investor essentially
constructs the portfolio of funds that best mimics the market portfolio. In that case, the
optimal portfolio with δ0 as speciÞed in equation (6) includes only three market index funds
(Table 1, Þrst column), whereas the optimal portfolio with δ0 = 0 contains over 40 funds.
This diﬀerence is easily explained. Suppose the portfolio already includes a fund that is a
good proxy for the market. With δ0 = 0, there is no penalty for adding more funds that
reduce tracking error a bit further, whatever those funds’ expenses. With δ0 < 0, the small
reduction in tracking error from adding funds is more than oﬀset by the penalty arising from
those funds’ somewhat higher expenses. Therefore, the optimal portfolio in the latter case
has fewer funds and a slightly larger tracking error, but the optimal portfolio in either case
has a correlation with the market that rounds to 100%.
11
A number of papers, including Jobson and Korkie (1980), show that using sample averages in meanvariance portfolio optimization typically results in portfolios with poor out-of-sample behavior.
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3.3.

Who should buy actively managed funds?

One might presume that actively managed funds should be purchased only by those investors
who admit some possibility that active fund managers possess stock-picking skill. For investors presented with our universe of 503 no-load funds, that need not be the answer. An
investor who believes completely in the CAPM and admits no possibility of managerial skill
does indeed invest only in market-index funds (Table 1). As the investor’s beliefs depart
from complete conÞdence in the CAPM, however, actively managed funds enter the optimal
portfolio even if the investor still adheres to a belief that managerial skill is impossible. If
one can invest directly and costlessly in the p passive assets used to deÞne the skill measure
δA , then indeed long positions in funds arise only when positive δA ’s are thought possible.
With positive δa ’s precluded, one simply combines the passive assets to obtain the highest
Sharpe ratio. Baks, Metrick, and Wachter (2001) essentially pose their active management
question in that context. If instead the p passive assets are not available for investment, as
in our setup, perfect substitutes for them need not exist in the mutual fund universe, let
alone in its passively managed subset. As a result, some actively managed funds can become
attractive even to investors who admit no chance of managerial skill.
A striking example of the above possibility occurs in the Þrst column of Table 2. The
investor in that case believes completely in the Fama-French model and in no chance of
managerial skill. Nevertheless, the bulk of that investor’s optimal portfolio is allocated to
actively managed value funds and real estate specialty funds: Legg Mason Total Return,
Mutual Discovery, First American Investment Real Estate Securities and DFA AEW Real
Estate Securities. Table 6 reports posterior means of the intercept and selected slopes in (2)
for all funds that receive at least a ten percent allocation in any of the porfolios in Tables
1 through 4. The selection of the above funds has nothing to do with their having superior
historical performance. In fact, three of the four funds listed above have negative δ̂A ’s. With
σαN = σδ = 0, the expected returns on these funds, gross of costs, are assumed to conform
exactly to the Fama-French model. The presence of these funds in the optimal portfolio
is instead driven by their risk characteristics. Note, for example, that all four funds have
signiÞcantly positive slopes on HML.
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3.4.

Hot hands?

To the universe of 503 no-load funds, we also add a portfolio of funds with high recent returns,
motivated by previous research indicating short-run persistence in fund performance.12 At
the end of each year, starting with December 1962, we sort all no-load equity funds by their
total returns over the previous twelve months (including only funds with returns reported for
those months) and form the equally weighted “hot-hand” portfolio of the top ten percent. As
Carhart (1997) observes, such a portfolio has a positive sensitivity to the momentum factor
MOM, which is conÞrmed by the results in Table 6. The hot-hand portfolio appears in the
last row, and the posterior mean of its coeﬃcient on MOM is 0.15 (with a “t statistic” of 8.7,
calculated as the posterior mean divided by posterior standard deviation). This portfolio
does not enter any of the optimal portfolios reported in Tables 1 through 4.13
As Carhart (1997) points out, the hot-hand portfolio is a kind of momentum play. Even
a strong belief in momentum, which in our setting amounts to a strong belief in Carhart’s
four-factor model, does not result in an allocation to the hot-hand strategy. As we discover,
one reason for this outcome is the existence of other funds that apparently oﬀer even stronger
momentum plays, at least in the sense that they have higher coeﬃcients on MOM. The Þrst
column of Table 3 displays the portfolio selected by an investor who rules out skill and has
complete conÞdence in the four-factor model. Note that the bulk of this portfolio is invested
in real estate funds. The regression results in Table 6 reveal that the posterior means of the
MOM coeﬃcients for many of these funds are higher than that for the hot-hand portfolio.
Perhaps as importantly, the coeﬃcients on SMB, HML, and MKT for these funds are also
positive and relatively large.14 The highest-Sharpe-ratio portfolio of the benchmarks in the
four-factor model contains those three factors and MOM in positive amounts. In our sample,
real estate funds oﬀer exposures to all four factors, and that feature makes them attractive
to investors who believe in that model. When prior beliefs admit the possibility of skill,
funds enter the optimal portfolio due to their average realized returns as well as their risk
characteristics. This doesn’t help the hot-hand portfolio, since the posterior mean of its δA
is less than a basis point from zero.15
12

See, for example, Grinblatt and Titman (1992), Hendricks, Patel, and Zeckhauser (1993), and Brown
and Goetzmann (1995).
13
When the hot-hand portfolio is formed from the universe of all funds, as opposed to just the no-load
subset, the posterior mean of its coeﬃcient on MOM is 0.21 with a t-statistic of 12.4. That version of the
hot-hand portfolio also does not enter any of the optimal portfolios in Tables 1 through 4.
14
This is consistent with the evidence in Sanders (1997), who reports signiÞcantly positive SMB, HML,
and MKT betas for real estate investment trust indices between 1978 and 1996.
15
The hot-hand porfolio has a positive alpha with respect to the Fama-French benchmarks and receives a
substantial positive allocation when the investment universe contains only those three benchmarks and the
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3.5.

What if the benchmarks were available for investment?

In constructing the optimal portfolios analyzed in Tables 1 through 5, we preclude investment directly in the benchmark indexes, due to the fact that their returns omit any costs
of implementing the underlying hypothetical investment strategies. The results discussed
earlier reveal that perfect conÞdence in either the Fama-French or Carhart four-factor model
does not result in an optimal portfolio of funds that closely mimics the optimal combination of the model’s benchmark indexes. For an investor who has complete conÞdence in the
Fama-French model and rules out skill (σαN = σδ = 0), the correlation between the portfolio
of funds and the optimal benchmark combination is only 0.75 (Table 2, Panel C). Moreover,
such an investor judges the highest Sharpe ratio obtainable within the fund universe to be
only 0.66 times that of the highest Sharpe ratio obtainable by combining the benchmarks.16
Under the Carhart model, the correlation between the optimal fund portfolio and the optimal combination of the four benchmarks is only 0.61 (Table 3, Panel C), and the Sharpe
ratio of the Þrst portfolio is only 0.54 times that of the second.17
Clearly, restricting the benchmark indexes to be unavailable for direct investment is not
innocuous. To calibrate further the importance of that restriction, Table 7 compares the
original funds-only portfolio with optimal portfolios computed under alternative scenarios
that allow unrestricted long or short positions in one or more of the benchmarks. For
example, the rows labeled “MKT” compare the original funds-only portfolio to the portfolio
constructed from a universe that also allows long or short positions in that market index.
As before, short fund positions are precluded. Recall that the fund universe oﬀers close
substitutes for a long position in MKT, so the principal diﬀerence here is the ability to short
that index. Not surprisingly, for an investor who believes dogmatically in the CAPM and
rules out skill, the ability to take a short position in MKT isn’t valuable (worth only 2 basis
points per month in certainty equivalent return with risk aversion again set to A = 2.75).
To an investor who centers his beliefs on the Fama-French model and rules out the
hot-hand portfolio. See Knox (1999) for a treatment of this case in a Bayesian portfolio-choice setting.
16
The latter number is not reported in the tables. If δ0 were set to zero for each fund, the correlation
between the two portfolios would equal the Sharpe ratio of the fund portfolio divided by the Sharpe ratio
of the benchmark portfolio. In that case, the second portfolio would have the highest possible Sharpe
ratio for the overall universe of funds and passive assets with investment weights unconstrained (i.e., short
sales permitted), and an exact relation between correlations and Sharpe ratios applies (e.g., Kandel and
Stambaugh, 1987, and Shanken, 1987).
17
The optimal combination of the Fama-French benchmarks is 32% in MKT, 4% in SMB, and 64% in
HML, and the optimal combination of the four factors is 16% in MKT, 15% in SMB, 40% in HML, and
29% in MOM. Since the factors are constructed as long-short spreads, an x% weight in a given factor is
interpreted as going x cents long and x cents short in the factor’s legs for each $1 invested in cash.
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possibility of skill, the ability to short MKT is worth a non-trivial 14 basis points per
month (Panel B). Evidently, the ability to short MKT helps compensate to some degree
for the inability otherwise to take the short positions inherent in SMB and HML. That
compensation is only partial, however, since the ability to take positions directly in the
latter two indexes is worth 66 basis points per month to that same investor, as indicated by
the Þrst entry in the second row of Panel B. (Recall that the optimal portfolio in the latter
case has a correlation of only 0.75 with the original portfolio, as conÞrmed in Panel B.) To
an investor who precludes skill and believes completely in the Carhart model, the ability to
take positions directly in that model’s four benchmarks is quite valuable–nearly 200 basis
points per month beyond the value provided by the funds-only portfolio (Panel C).
The ability to take long or short positions in the benchmarks generally becomes more
valuable as the investor admits some possibility of managerial skill. In essence, as the funds’
track records lead to the inference that some of their δA ’s are positive, the ability to short
MKT against such funds allows the investor to take large oﬀsetting positions in the funds
and MKT and thereby achieve high Sharpe ratios. As indicated by the results in Table 7,
most of the enormous potential gains in such cases are indeed achieved by simply allowing
short positions in MKT. That is, the increments to the certainty-equivalent return produced
by allowing positions in the remaining benchmarks are relatively modest when σδ is 2% or
more.
The main reason for the lack of benchmark substitutes is our precluding short sales of
mutual funds. When the short-sale constraint is removed, the Sharpe ratio of the optimal
fund portfolio increases to 0.99 times the Sharpe ratio of the eﬃcient benchmark combination
under the Fama-French model and to 0.94 times the maximum under the Carhart model
(with σα = σδ = 0 in both cases). Since only a relatively small subset of funds can be
shorted in practice, precluding short sales in our fund universe seems reasonable. We also
redid the analysis with an expanded investment universe of 919 funds that includes funds
with load fees. The improvement from including the load funds is surprisingly small, despite
the fact that we ignore their load fees. With complete belief in the four-factor model and
skill precluded, the Sharpe ratio rises only to 0.55 times the maximum achievable using
the benchmarks, as compared to a multiple of 0.54 in the original no-load setting. Under
the Fama-French model, the Sharpe ratio rises so little that it rounds, as before, to only
0.66 times the maximum achievable with the benchmarks. Thus, the universe of all equity
mutual funds with at least three years of history as of December 1998, including the load
funds, provides no close substitutes for the Fama-French and momentum benchmarks.
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A positive value for a fund’s alpha, the intercept in (3), indicates that adding the fund to
a universe containing only the benchmarks raises the maximum Sharpe ratio. Baks, Metrick,
and Wachter (2001) explore the role of informative prior beliefs about alpha in forming an
inference that the posterior mean of a fund’s alpha is positive. Their fund-by-fund analysis
addresses the question of whether there exist any funds that would be attractive to an
investor who can already invest directly in the benchmarks, but it does not address the
overall value to such an investor of the ability to select one or more mutual funds from the
available universe. That value is computed in Table 8, which compares portfolios containing
only benchmarks to portfolios containing both benchmarks and funds.
The results in Table 8 conÞrm, not surprisingly, that if all of a pricing model’s benchmark
indexes are available for investment, then mutual funds have no value to an investor who
believes completely in the pricing model and rules out skill. If that investor maintains a belief
in the model’s ability to price passive assets but admits some possibility of managerial skill,
then funds become valuable. When σδ is 2%, the ability to add funds to a portfolio containing
only the model’s benchmarks is worth at least 263 basis points per month to an investor who
believes completely in any of the three pricing models. As in the comparisons presented in
Table 7, the ability to take short positions in the benchmarks, especially MKT, makes the
opportunity to take long fund positions quite valuable as skill uncertainty increases. The
results in Table 8 also show that mispricing uncertainty has only minor eﬀects on the value
of having mutual funds available to an investor who can invest directly in the benchmarks.
That is, to an investor who can earn the hypothetical costless returns on the benchmark
indexes, the incremental value of mutual funds lies primarily in the potential skill of fund
managers, as opposed to allowing the investor to exploit the inability of the benchmarks to
price other passive assets.

3.6.

How have the strategies performed?

The portfolios analyzed previously are selected using data through the end of our sample
period, so the portfolios are optimal at that point in time under the various prior beliefs about
pricing and skill. To investigate the eﬀects that diﬀerences in prior beliefs can have on actual
performance, we examine the out-of-sample returns on portfolios formed at earlier points in
time, beginning 20 years before the end of our full sample.18 Each month we construct ex18
Since our methodology relies on long histories of passive asset returns, and these histories go back only
to July 1963 in our sample, beginning the out-of-sample exercise earlier in the sample would introduce very
noisy estimates of the passive-asset moments.
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ante-optimal portfolios by combining the diﬀerent prior beliefs about skill and pricing with
historical asset returns up through that month. The portfolios are rebalanced each month
to incorporate the additional return history as well as changes in the fund universe, which
consists of all no-load funds with at least three years of available data.
Table 9 reports the Sharpe ratios of the strategies for the last 20 years, January 1979
through December 1998, as well as for the Þrst and second 10-year subperiods. For the 20year period, the annualized ex-post Sharpe ratios range from 0.42 to 0.66, depending on prior
beliefs about pricing and skill. Not surprisingly, the diﬀerences across strategies are even
more substantial within the shorter subperiods. Thus, not only do the various priors lead to
important diﬀerences in ex ante performance (as in Table 5), they would have also produced
some non-trivial diﬀerences ex post. For comparison, we also report the Sharpe ratios of the
value-weighted market portfolio, the hot-hand strategy described in the previous section, and
a “Þve-diamond” strategy. To implement the latter strategy, we sort all funds each month
by their sample Sharpe ratios over the previous ten years (or less, if ten years of data are not
available) and then equally weight the funds in the top decile–the “Þve-diamond” funds.19
The Sharpe ratios of these three alternative strategies generally fall somewhere within the
range of Sharpe ratios produced by the diﬀerent beliefs about skill and pricing.
For a given belief about pricing, investors with no prejudice against managerial skill
(σδ = ∞) generally did somewhat better than investors who precluded it (σδ = 0) over
this particular sample period. The reader is cautioned from reading too much into such
results, since 20 years is still a fairly short period over which to judge diﬀerences in ex post
performance of equity strategies. In other words, such results are unlikely to tell any but
the most indiﬀerent investor the “correct” prior to use in going forward. (Note, for example,
that an investor who picked his strategy using ex post performance through 1988 would not
have experienced the highest subsequent performance.) Based on the 20-year performance,
believing dogmatically in the CAPM and ruling out skill would seem to be as good a set
of beliefs as any, but clearly many investors with other views about pricing and skill would
not be so easily deterred. Our intention here is simply to provide some additional historical
perspective on the important role of prior beliefs in the mutual-fund investment decision.
19

This ranking is similar in spirit to the “Þve-star” ranking by Morningstar, Inc., a leading provider of
mutual fund information. Morningstar ranks funds into Þve categories (one to Þve stars) based on a riskadjusted rating in which a measure of the fund’s downside volatility is subtracted from a measure of the fund’s
average excess return. Although the Sharpe ratio and the Morningstar rating are deÞned diﬀerently, they
share the same basic risk-adjustment concept and often provide similar rankings of funds, as demonstrated
by Sharpe (1997, 1998).
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4.

Conclusions

This study develops and applies a framework in which beliefs about pricing models and
managerial skill are combined with information in the data to select portfolios of mutual
funds. Nonbenchmark passive assets provide additional information about the mutual funds’
expected returns, and they allow us to specify prior beliefs that distinguish mispricing from
skill. In addition, nonbenchmark assets help account for common variation in fund returns,
making the investment problem feasible with a large universe of funds.
We construct portfolios with maximum Sharpe ratios from a universe of 503 no-load
equity mutual funds. The optimal portfolios are substantially aﬀected by prior beliefs about
pricing and skill as well as by including the information in nonbenchmark assets. A pricing
model is useful to an investor seeking a high Sharpe ratio, even if the investor has less
than complete conÞdence in the model’s pricing accuracy and cannot invest directly in the
benchmarks. With investment in the benchmarks precluded, even investors who believe
completely in a pricing model and rule out the possibility of manager skill can include active
funds in their portfolios. The fund universe oﬀers no close substitutes for the Fama-French
and momentum benchmarks, and active funds can be better substitutes for the benchmarks
than passive funds. We also Þnd that the “hot-hand” portfolio of the previous year’s bestperforming funds does not appear in the portfolio of funds with the highest Sharpe ratio,
even when momentum is believed to be priced.
Maximizing the Sharpe ratio is only one of many investment objectives. With a multiperiod investment objective, for example, beliefs about pricing and skill could exhibit
diﬀerent eﬀects. A multiperiod setting could also allow a meaningful consideration of the
funds that charge load fees. Incorporating changes over time in fund betas would also be
desirable. Such extensions oﬀer challenges for future research.
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Appendix
This Appendix derives the moments of the predictive distribution of the fund returns. We
Þrst provide the predictive moments of the returns on passive assets. Those moments are
then combined with the posterior moments of the parameters in (1) and (2), derived in
Pástor and Stambaugh (2001), to obtain the predictive moments of the fund returns.
DeÞne Y = (rN,1 , . . . , rN,T )0 , X = (rB,1 , . . . , rB,T )0 , and Z = (ιT X), where ιT denotes a
T -vector of ones. Also deÞne the (k + 1) × m matrix G = (αN BN )0 , and let g = vec (G).
For the T observations t = 1, . . . , T , the regression model in (1) can be written as
Y = ZG + U,

vec (U) ∼ N (0, Σ ⊗ IT ),

(A.1)

where U = (²N,1 , . . . , ²N,T )0 . Let EB and VBB denote the mean and covariance matrix of the
normal distribution for rB,t , let θP denote the parameters of the joint distribution of the
passive asset returns (G, Σ, EB , and VBB ), and deÞne the T × p sample matrix of passive
returns, RP = (X Y ). The appendix of Pástor and Stambaugh (2001) reports the posterior
moments of the elements of θP . Those moments include the posterior mean and variance of
g, denoted by g̃ and Var(g|RP ), the posterior mean and variance of EB , denoted by ẼB and
Var(EB |RP ), and the posterior means of Σ and VBB , denoted by Σ̃ and ṼBB .20
The predictive moments of the passive returns are derived in Pástor and Stambaugh
0
0
0
(2000) in a diﬀerent context. DeÞne rP,T +1 = (rN,T
+1 rB,T +1 ) . Its predictive mean is
EP∗ = E(rP,T +1 |RP ) =

Ã

α̃N + B̃N ẼB
ẼB

!

,

(A.2)

where α̃N and B̃N are obtained using g̃ = vec ((α̃N B̃N )0 ). Partition the predictive covariance
matrix as
"
#
∗
∗
V
V
NN
NB
.
(A.3)
VP∗ = Var(rP,T +1 |RP ) =
∗
∗
VBN
VBB
Denote the i-th row of BN as b0i , the i-th column of G as gi , and the (i, j) element of Σ as
σi,j . The Þrst submatrix, VN∗ N , can be represented in terms of its (i, j) element:
∗
∗
∗
b̃j + tr [VBB
)(i,j) = b̃0i VBB
Cov(bi , b0j |RP )] + σ̃i,j + [1 ẼB0 ]Cov(gi , gj0 |RP )[1 ẼB0 ]0 . (A.4)
(VNN

Note that Cov(bi , b0j |RP ) and Cov(gi , gj0 |RP ) are submatrices of Var(g|RP ). The remaining
submatrices in (A.3) can be shown to be equal to
∗
= ṼBB + Var(EB |RP )
VBB
0

20

∗
∗
= VBN
= B̃N ṼBB + B̃N Var(EB |RP ).
VNB

Posterior means are denoted using tildes throughout the Appendix.
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Let us now turn to the regression model (2), which can be written as
rA,T +1 = δA + c0A rP,T +1 + uT +1

(A.5)

0
= [1 rP,T
+1 ]φA + uT +1 ,

(A.6)

where φA = (δA c0A )0 . Let R denote all of the sample returns data on funds and passive assets
through period T , and let θA denote the set of parameters φA and σu2 . The posterior moments
of the elements of θA are reported in the appendix of Pástor and Stambaugh (2001). Those
moments include the posterior mean and variance of φA , denoted by φ̃A and Var(φA |R), and
the posterior mean of σu2 , denoted by σ̃u2 .
The derivation of the predictive moments of fund returns parallels the derivation in Pástor
and Stambaugh (2000) of the predictive moments of the nonbenchmark returns, rN,T +1 . Since
cA and EP (the mean of rP,t ) are independent in the prior, the predictive mean of rA,T +1 is
E(rA,T +1 |R) = E(δA + c0A EP |R) = δ̃A + c̃0A ẼP .

(A.7)

Note that ẼP , the posterior mean of EP , is equal to the predictive mean EP∗ . The predictive
variance of rA,T +1 can be written as
Var(rA,T +1 |R) = E(Var(rA,T +1 |R, φA )|R) + Var(E(rA,T +1 |R, φA )|R).

(A.8)

To compute the Þrst term on the right-hand side of (A.8), observe using (A.5) that
Var(rA,T +1 |R, φA ) = c0A VP∗ cA + σ̃u2 ,

(A.9)

since the predictive variance of uT +1 equals the posterior mean of σu2 by the law of iterated
expectations (conditioning on σu2 ). Taking expectations gives
E(Var(rA,T +1 |R, φA )|R) = c̃0A VP∗ c̃A + tr [VP∗ Cov(cA , c0A |R)] + σ̃u2 .

(A.10)

To compute the second term on the right-hand side of (A.8), observe using (A.6) that
E(rA,T +1 |R, φA ) = [1 ẼP0 ]φA ,

(A.11)

Var(E(rA,T +1 |R, φA )|R) = [1 ẼP0 ]Cov(φA , φ0A |R)[1 ẼP0 ]0 .

(A.12)

so
Note that Cov(cA , c0A |R) is a submatrix of the posterior covariance matrix Var(φA |R) ≡
Cov(φA , φ0A |R).
Computing the predictive covariance of rA,T +1 with the return on another fund J, rJ,T +1 ,
is simpliÞed by the independence across funds of (i) the disturbances in (A.5) and (ii) the
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posteriors for the coeﬃcient vectors φA and φJ . Applying the same approach as used above
for the predictive variance gives
Cov(rA,T +1 , rJ,T +1 |R) = c̃0A VP∗ c̃J .

(A.13)

Computing the predictive covariance of rA,T +1 with the vector of returns on the passive
assets, rP,T +1 , is simpliÞed by the independence of the posterior for φA from that of EP and
VP . Let θ denote the union of θP and θA . Using the law of iterated expectations and the
variance decomposition rule gives
Cov(rA,T +1 , rP,T +1 |R) = E(Cov(rA,T +1 , rP,T +1 |R, θ)|R) + Cov(E(rA,T +1 |R, θ), E(rP,T +1 |R, θ)|R)
= E(VP cA |R) + Cov(δA + c0A EP , EP |R)

= ṼP c̃A + Cov(EP , EP0 |R)c̃A
= VP∗ c̃A .

(A.14)
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Table 1
Portfolios with the Highest Sharpe Ratio Under Priors for CAPM
Mispricing and Skill of Fund Managers
The investment universe consists of 503 no-load equity mutual funds with at least three years of return history
through December 1998. The benchmark index return MKT is the excess return on the value-weighted stock
market. The correlations and certainty-equivalent diﬀerences in Panels B and C are computed with respect
to the same predictive distribution used to obtain the optimal fund portfolio in the same column. The
certainty-equivalent diﬀerences are computed with relative risk aversion equal to 2.75.

Mispricing uncertainty (σαN ) in percent per year:
Skill uncertainty (σδ ) in percent per year:

0
0

0
1

0
3

A. Portfolio weights (×100)
Ameristock Mutual Fund
- 22
BT Institutional:Equity 500 Index Fund
23 41 California Investment S&P 500 Index Fund
53 - Cohen & Steers Realty Shares
- Century Shares Trust
- DFA AEW Real Estate Securities Portfolio
- Elfun Trusts
- First American Investment:Real Est Sec/Y
- First Funds:Growth and Income Portfolio/I
6 Gabelli Asset Fund
- Galaxy Funds II:Utility Index Fund
- IDS Utilities Income Fund/Y
- Legg Mason Eq Tr:Value Fund/Navigator
- 23
MassMutual Instl Funds:Small Cap Value Eqty/S - Oakmark Fund
- 1
Robertson Stephens Inv Tr:Information Age/A
- T. Rowe Price Dividend Growth Fund
- T. Rowe Price Equity Income Fund
- 30 UAM Fds Tr:Heitman Real Estate Portfolio/Inst
- Vanguard Index Tr:Extended Market Port/Inv
24 - Vanguard PrimeCap Fund
- 23 4
Weitz Series Fund:Hickory Portfolio
- Weitz Series Fund:Value Portfolio
- 51

0
∞

1
0

1
1

1 1
3 ∞

2
0

2
1

71
15
14

16
44
8
32
-

- 22 - - 23 - - - - - - 8 - - - 3 5
- - - 11 - - - 18 4
5 - - - - - - 11 5
5 - - - - - - - - - - 32 18
- - - - 2
- 17 67 - - - - 5 - 4 - - - - 11 - - - - - 4
59 - - - 57
- - - - 3
- - - 12 9 - - - - 3 2 - - 54 20 - 1

2
3

2
∞

20 - - - - - - - - 5 - - 4 59
- 8 - 5
- - - - - 6 8
57 28

B. Comparison to the portfolio that is optimal for the universe that excludes
the funds in the above portfolio.
Correlation (×100)
99 98 93 91 99 98 93 91 95 95 91 92
Certainty-equivalent diﬀerence (basis pts./mo.)
0 1 12 43 1 2 12 40 4 5 12 32
Correlation (×100)

C. Comparison to the benchmark index MKT.
100 99 95 93 100 98 94 94 89 92 93 94
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Table 2
Portfolios with the Highest Sharpe Ratio Under Priors for Fama-French-Model
Mispricing and Skill of Fund Managers
The investment universe consists of 503 no-load equity mutual funds with at least three years of return history
through December 1998. The benchmark factors are MKT, the excess return on the value-weighted stock
market, SMB, the diﬀerence between returns on small and large stocks, and HML, the diﬀerence between
returns on high and low book-to-market stocks. The correlations and certainty-equivalent diﬀerences in
Panels B and C are computed with respect to the same predictive distribution used to obtain the optimal
fund portfolio in the same column. The certainty-equivalent diﬀerences are computed with relative risk
aversion equal to 2.75.

Mispricing uncertainty (σαN ) in percent per year:
Skill uncertainty (σδ ) in percent per year:

0
0

0
1

0
3

0 1
∞ 0

A. Portfolio weights (×100)
Ameristock Mutual Fund
- - 10 CGM Realty Fund
- 3 - Cohen & Steers Realty Shares
- - - Columbia Real Estate Equity Fund
- - - DFA AEW Real Estate Securities Portfolio
13 1 - DFA Invest Grp:US Large Cap Value Port
2 - - First American Investment:Real Est Sec/Y
19 13 - Galaxy Funds II:Utility Index Fund
8 5 - Legg Mason Eq Tr:Total Return Fund/Navigator 40 10 - Legg Mason Eq Tr:Value Fund/Navigator
- - - 44
Mutual Discovery Fund/Z
18 39 37 26
Oakmark Fund
- - 2 T. Rowe Price Equity Income Fund
- 29 7 UAM Fds Tr:Heitman Real Estate Portfolio/Inst - - - Weitz Series Fund:Hickory Portfolio
- - - 1
Weitz Series Fund:Value Portfolio
- - 45 29

17
20
13
34
15
-

1
1

1 1
3 ∞

2
0

2
1

2 2
3 ∞

- 9 4 - - - - - 4 - - - 15 - 11 - 6 - - - 43
35 34 24
- 3 25 8 - - - - 3
- 47 31

6
3
21
21
22
21
6
-

- 6 4 - 5 - 3 - 8 - - - 15 - 18 - - - - - 41
25 28 18
- 4 17 12 3 - - - 6
- 50 35

B. Comparison to the portfolio that is optimal for the universe that excludes
the funds in the above portfolio.
Correlation (×100)
95 95 92 93 94 95 92 93 93 94 91 93
Certainty-equivalent diﬀerence (basis pts./mo.)
9 11 19 25 8 11 18 24 11 10 15 23
C. Comparison to the combination of the benchmark indexes MKT, SMB,
and HML having the highest Sharpe ratio.
Correlation (×100)
75 74 66 55 75 75 65 55 73 74 64 54
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Table 3
Portfolios with the Highest Sharpe Ratio Under Priors for Four-Factor-Model
Mispricing and Skill of Fund Managers
The investment universe consists of 503 no-load equity mutual funds with at least three years of return
history through December 1998. The benchmark factors are MKT, the excess return on the value-weighted
stock market, SMB, the diﬀerence between returns on small and large stocks, HML, the diﬀerence between
returns on high and low book-to-market stocks, and MOM, the diﬀerence between returns on stocks with high
and low returns over the previous year (excluding the most recent month). The correlations and certaintyequivalent diﬀerences in Panels B and C are computed with respect to the same predictive distribution used
to obtain the optimal fund portfolio in the same column. The certainty-equivalent diﬀerences are computed
with relative risk aversion equal to 2.75.

Mispricing uncertainty (σαN ) in percent per year:
Skill uncertainty (σδ ) in percent per year:

0
0

0
1

0
3

0 1
∞ 0

A. Portfolio weights (×100)
Alpine US Real Estate Equity Fund/Y
- 1 - CGM Realty Fund
1 10 6 Cohen & Steers Realty Shares
14 14 9 Columbia Real Estate Equity Fund
11 12 6 DFA AEW Real Estate Securities Portfolio
28 19 - First American Investment:Real Est Sec/Y
20 16 4 Gabelli Asset Fund
- - 8 Galaxy Funds II:Utility Index Fund
14 11 - Legg Mason Eq Tr:Value Fund/Navigator
- - - 48
Lindner/Ryback Small Cap Fund/Investor
- - - 2
Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Ist:US Real Est/A
- - 2 Mutual Discovery Fund/Z
- - 4 7
T. Rowe Price Dividend Growth Fund
- - 14 UAM Fds Tr:Heitman Real Estate Portfolio/Inst 13 16 9 Weitz Series Fund:Hickory Portfolio
- - - 10
Weitz Series Fund:Value Portfolio
- - 38 34

14
10
27
19
17
12
-

1
1

1 1
3 ∞

2
0

2
1

2 2
3 ∞

1 - 9 6 14 9 12 6 19 - 16 5 - 6 13 - - - 46
- - 2
- 2 - 3 6
- 15 16 9 - - 11
- 39 35

14
9
26
18
21
11
-

1 - 8 5 14 10 11 7 18 - 15 5 - 1 18 - - - 44
- - 1
- 3 - 2 5
- 16 15 9 - 1 12
- 40 37

B. Comparison to the portfolio that is optimal for the universe that excludes
the funds in the above portfolio.
Correlation (×100)
87 89 93 92 87 89 93 92 88 89 93 92
Certainty-equivalent diﬀerence (basis pts./mo.)
25 24 19 23 26 24 19 22 24 24 20 24
C. Comparison to the combination of the benchmark indexes MKT, SMB,
HML, and MOM having the highest Sharpe ratio.
Correlation (×100)
61 62 50 30 61 62 50 30 61 62 50 30
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Table 4
Portfolios with the Highest Sharpe Ratio Under Priors for Skill
of Fund Managers and No Use of a Pricing Model (σαN = ∞)
The investment universe consists of 503 no-load equity mutual funds with at least three years of return
history through December 1998. The benchmark factors are MKT, the excess return on the value-weighted
stock market, SMB, the diﬀerence between returns on small and large stocks, HML, the diﬀerence between
returns on high and low book-to-market stocks, and MOM, the diﬀerence between returns on stocks with high
and low returns over the previous year (excluding the most recent month). The correlations and certaintyequivalent diﬀerences in Panels B through E are computed with respect to the same predictive distribution
used to obtain the optimal fund portfolio in the same column. The certainty-equivalent diﬀerences are
computed with relative risk aversion equal to 2.75.

0

1

2

3

∞

A. Portfolio weights (×100)
CGM Realty Fund
Cohen & Steers Realty Shares
13
Cappiello-Rushmore Trust:Utility Income Fund
Columbia Real Estate Equity Fund
7
DFA AEW Real Estate Securities Portfolio
20
First American Investment:Real Est Sec/Y
14
Galaxy Funds II:Utility Index Fund
37
IDS Utilities Income Fund/Y
Legg Mason Eq Tr:Value Fund/Navigator
Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Ist:US Real Est/A
Oakmark Fund
T. Rowe Price Dividend Growth Fund
UAM Fds Tr:Heitman Real Estate Portfolio/Inst
9
Weitz Partners Value Fund
Weitz Series Fund:Hickory Portfolio
Weitz Series Fund:Value Portfolio
-

2
14
1
9
14
12
32
5
12
-

2
13
9
2
11
21
5
2
11
24

1
11
7
6
8
5
6
8
6
42

32
3
2
2
18
43

Skill uncertainty (σδ ) in percent per year:

B. Comparison to the portfolio that is optimal for the universe that excludes
the funds in the above portfolio.
Correlation (×100)
89 89 90 92 92
Certainty-equivalent diﬀerence (basis pts./mo.)
27 27 22 21 24
C. Correlation (×100) with the portfolio having
that combines the benchmark factors shown
MKT
MKT, SMB, HML
MKT, SMB, HML, MOM

the highest Sharpe ratio
87
64
50

94
51
31

D. Comparison to the portfolio that is optimal under σδ = 0
Correlation (×100)
100 100 97 89
Certainty-equivalent diﬀerence (basis pts./mo.)
0
1
6
23

71
133

E. Comparison to the portfolio that is optimal
when expected returns equal sample means
Correlation (×100)
68 69 75
Certainty-equivalent diﬀerence (basis pts./mo.)
477 440 367

91
187

28

74
66
59

76
66
60

82
66
57

80
310

Table 5
Comparisons of Portfolios of No-Load Funds Formed Under Various
Prior Beliefs About Manager Skill and Pricing Models
All portfolios being compared are formed from an investment universe of 503 no-load equity mutual funds with at
least three years of return history through December 1998. The pricing models considered are the Capital Asset
Pricing Model of Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965), the three-factor Fama-French (1993) model, and the four-factor
model of Carhart (1997), which adds a momentum factor to the Fama-French model. All of the reported correlations
and certainty-equivalent diﬀerences are computed using the predictive distribution formed under the prior mispricing
uncertainty (σαN ) and skill uncertainty (σδ ) in the column heading. The certainty-equivalent diﬀerence is computed
with relative risk aversion equal to 2.75.

Mispricing uncertainty (σαN ) in percent per year:
Skill uncertainty (σδ ) in percent per year:

0
0

2
0

2
1

2
3

2
∞

A. Comparison of the portfolios formed with the same σαN and σδ under
diﬀerent pricing models
Certainty-equivalent diﬀerence (basis points per month)
CAPM versus Fama-French
26 25 19 28 23 19 14 21 9
CAPM versus four-factor
59 61 34 18 50 51 28 13 24
Fama-French versus four-factor
24 29 19 3 19 23 17 2 10

8
27
13

8
19
13

10
5
1

Correlation (×100)
CAPM versus Fama-French
CAPM versus four-factor
Fama-French versus four-factor

96
89
94

97 98
93 99
94 100

87
73
89

0
1

89
71
84

0
3

93
91
94

0
∞

94
96
99

1
0

87
76
92

1
1

91
75
88

1
3

95
92
94

1
∞

96
97
99

97
94
97

B. Comparison of the optimal portfolio to
skeptical” investor (σαN = ∞ and σδ = 0)
Certainty-equivalent diﬀerence (basis points per month)
CAPM
71 74
Fama-French
28 35
Four-factor
4
6

138 299 53
94 227 22
35 153 3

57 121 275 26
27 85 217 11
5 34 151 2

29
15
3

89 232
67 196
31 147

Correlation (×100)
CAPM
Fama-French
Four-factor

70
73
87

74
86
97

90
93
98

73
73
88

73
87
98

71
82
97

the portfolio of a “completely

60
69
69

77
91
98

71
73
87

62
69
69

95
96
99

65
70
69

C. Comparison of the optimal portfolio to the portfolio that is optimal when
expected returns equal sample means
Certainty-equivalent diﬀerence (basis points per month)
CAPM
393 356 259 172 395 358 262 171 404 367 270 171
Fama-French
414 380 281 171 417 383 282 172 426 390 285 174
Four-factor
465 428 302 185 466 429 303 185 468 431 305 185
Correlation (×100)
CAPM
Fama-French
Four-factor

95
81
67

29

95
82
67

94
84
82

94
93
94

94
80
67

94
82
68

93
84
82

95
93
94

83
77
68

87
79
68

89
84
81

95
93
93

Table 6
Coeﬃcients in Regressions of Fund Returns on the Passive Asset Returns
The table reports posterior means (multiplied by 100) of the intercept (δA ) and selected slope coeﬃcients in a regression of the
fund’s return on the returns of eight passive assets. The passive assets are CMS, a spread between stocks with high and low HML
betas but with both legs matched in terms of market capitalization (size) and book-to-market ratios, IP1—IP3, three portfolios
formed by applying principal-component analysis to a set of 20 industry portfolios, MOM, the diﬀerence between returns on stocks
with high and low returns over the previous year (excluding the most recent month), SMB, the diﬀerence between returns on small
and large stocks, HML, the diﬀerence between returns on high and low book-to-market stocks, and MKT, the excess return on the
value-weighted stock market. The coeﬃcients denoted by ‡ († ) are statistically signiÞcant at the 1% (5%) level. The “t statistics”
used to determine signiÞcance are calculated by dividing the coeﬃcient’s posterior mean by posterior standard deviation.

δ
Ameristock Mutual Fund
0.39†
BT Institutional:Equity 500 Index Fund
0.09
CGM Realty Fund
-0.14
California Investment S&P 500 Index Fund
0.07
Century Shares Trust
-0.45
Cohen & Steers Realty Shares
-0.22
Columbia Real Estate Equity Fund
-0.26
DFA AEW Real Estate Securities Portfolio
-0.59†
First American Investment:Real Est Sec/Y
-0.29
Galaxy Funds II:Utility Index Fund
-0.57†
Legg Mason Eq Tr:Total Return Fund/Navigator -0.16
Legg Mason Eq Tr:Value Fund/Navigator
0.84‡
Mutual Discovery Fund/Z
0.34
Robertson Stephens Inv Tr:Information Age/A
1.13
T. Rowe Price Dividend Growth Fund
0.21†
T. Rowe Price Equity Income Fund
0.16†
UAM Fds Tr:Heitman Real Estate Portfolio/Inst -0.32
Vanguard Index Tr:Extended Market Port/Inv
-0.08
Vanguard PrimeCap Fund
0.44‡
Weitz Series Fund:Hickory Portfolio
0.56
Weitz Series Fund:Value Portfolio
0.41†
Hot-Hand Portfolio

-0.00

30

MOM SMB HML MKT
-6
-34‡
8
90‡
‡
-2
-25
-2
96‡
†
‡
‡
19
58
63
109‡
-2
-24‡
-2
96‡
‡
9
8
43
132‡
‡
‡
‡
28
69
53
102‡
22‡
46‡
61‡
94‡
‡
‡
‡
23
57
64
99‡
†
‡
‡
16
47
71
106‡
13‡
13
63‡
140‡
‡
-6
10
67
91‡
-5
-24†
-14
82‡
‡
‡
-10
39
57
64‡
‡
8
32 -133
75†
4
-3
20‡
78‡
‡
‡
-6
0
36
70‡
‡
‡
‡
31
70
52
107‡
6‡
54‡
-3
103‡
‡
-3
9
-32
68‡
‡
0
61
18
108‡
-4
19‡
18†
72‡
15‡

48‡

-8†

93‡

Table 7
Comparisons of Portfolios of No-Load Funds With and Without
the Benchmark Indexes Available for Investment
Portfolios formed from an investment universe of 503 no-load equity mutual funds with at least three years of return
history through December 1998 are compared to portfolios formed from a universe of the same 503 funds plus one or
more passive benchmark indexes. The latter indexes have returns denoted by MKT, the excess return on the valueweighted stock market, SMB, the diﬀerence between returns on small and large stocks, HML, the diﬀerence between
returns on high and low book-to-market stocks, and MOM, the diﬀerence between returns on stocks with high and
low returns over the previous year (excluding the most recent month). The pricing models considered are the Capital
Asset Pricing Model of Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965), the three-factor Fama-French (1993) model, and the
four-factor model of Carhart (1997), which adds a momentum factor to the Fama-French model. All of the reported
correlations and certainty-equivalent diﬀerences are computed using the predictive distribution formed under the prior
mispricing uncertainty (σαN ) and skill uncertainty (σδ ) in the column heading. The certainty-equivalent diﬀerence
is computed with relative risk aversion equal to 2.75. Each row compares the funds-only portfolio to the portfolio
that can contain the funds as well as the benchmarks indicated in the left-hand row heading. The benchmarks can
enter with either long or short positions, whereas short positions in the funds are precluded throughout.

Mispricing uncertainty (σαN ) in percent per year:
Skill uncertainty (σδ ) in percent per year:

0
0

0
1

0
2

0
3

0
∞

2
0

2
1

2
2

2
3

2
∞

A. Pricing-model beliefs centered on the CAPM
Certainty-equivalent diﬀerence (basis points per month)
MKT
2
2 245 908 4788 1
MKT, SMB, HML
2
5 298 997 4937 8
MKT, SMB, HML, MOM
2
6 299 1020 5384 26

4 279 959 4859
14 322 1036 5039
30 324 1044 5407

Correlation (×100)
MKT
MKT, SMB, HML
MKT, SMB, HML, MOM

94
86
75

100 97
100 92
100 91

39
36
36

25
24
24

17
17
16

99
92
80

B. Pricing-model beliefs centered on the Fama-French three-factor
Certainty-equivalent diﬀerence (basis points per month)
MKT
14 34 297 959 4817 10
MKT, SMB, HML
66 66 361 1062 5022 61
MKT, SMB, HML, MOM
66 67 361 1085 5471 75
Correlation (×100)
MKT
MKT, SMB, HML
MKT, SMB, HML, MOM

88
75
75

79
72
72

44
41
41

29
27
27

17
17
16

92
74
73

39
36
36

25
24
24

16
16
16

model
32 320 998 4876
65 377 1091 5095
79 378 1100 5474
81
73
71

42
40
40

28
27
26

17
16
16

C. Pricing-model beliefs centered on the Carhart four-factor model
Certainty-equivalent diﬀerence (basis points per month)
MKT
9 56 428 1161 5108 10 55 425 1157 5100
MKT, SMB, HML
73 123 488 1249 5395 71 120 485 1244 5381
MKT, SMB, HML, MOM
197 202 515 1250 5651 194 200 513 1245 5631
Correlation (×100)
MKT
MKT, SMB, HML
MKT, SMB, HML, MOM

95
73
61

31

77
64
59

40
37
37

26
25
25

16
15
15

94
74
61

78
65
60

40
38
38

26
25
25

16
15
15

Table 8
Comparisons of Portfolios of the Benchmark Indexes With and Without
the No-Load Funds Available for Investment
Portfolios containing one or more passive benchmark indexes are compared to portfolios that combine those indexes
with any of the 503 no-load equity mutual funds with at least three years of return history through December
1998. The benchmark indexes have returns denoted by MKT, the excess return on the value-weighted stock market,
SMB, the diﬀerence between returns on small and large stocks, HML, the diﬀerence between returns on high and
low book-to-market stocks, and MOM, the diﬀerence between returns on stocks with high and low returns over
the previous year (excluding the most recent month). The pricing models considered are the Capital Asset Pricing
Model of Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965), the three-factor Fama-French (1993) model, and the four-factor model
of Carhart (1997), which adds a momentum factor to the Fama-French model. All of the reported correlations and
certainty-equivalent diﬀerences are computed using the predictive distribution formed under the prior mispricing
uncertainty (σαN ) and skill uncertainty (σδ ) in the column heading. The certainty-equivalent diﬀerence is computed
with relative risk aversion equal to 2.75. Each row compares the portfolio containing only the benchmarks in the
left-hand row heading to the portfolio that can contain the funds as well as those benchmarks. The benchmarks can
enter with either long or short positions, whereas short positions in the funds are precluded throughout.

Mispricing uncertainty (σαN ) in percent per year:
Skill uncertainty (σδ ) in percent per year:

0
0

0
1

0
2

0
3

0
∞

A. Pricing-model beliefs centered on the CAPM
Certainty-equivalent diﬀerence (basis points per month)
MKT
0
4 263 943 4908
MKT, SMB, HML
0
7 316 1032 5056
MKT, SMB, HML, MOM
0
8 316 1056 5503
Correlation (×100)
MKT
MKT, SMB, HML
MKT, SMB, HML, MOM

100 93
100 89
100 88

30
28
28

17
16
16

7
7
7

2
0

2
1

5
1
0

12 301 997 4966
11 333 1064 5135
8 317 1052 5484

92 83
99 88
100 93

2
2

29
32
39

2
3

16
19
23

2
∞

7
9
10

B. Pricing-model beliefs centered on the Fama-French three-factor model
Certainty-equivalent diﬀerence (basis points per month)
MKT
38 65 342 1019 4936 39 66 363 1054 4989
MKT, SMB, HML
0
7 316 1031 5051 0
9 329 1057 5118
MKT, SMB, HML, MOM
0
8 316 1055 5500 0
8 316 1052 5481
Correlation (×100)
MKT
MKT, SMB, HML
MKT, SMB, HML, MOM

64 54
100 97
100 97

27
52
52

16
32
32

7
15
14

63 54
100 96
100 97

26
51
54

16
32
33

7
15
15

C. Pricing-model beliefs centered on the Carhart four-factor model
Certainty-equivalent diﬀerence (basis points per month)
MKT
64 114 480 1218 5212 68 115 480 1215 5203
MKT, SMB, HML
38 91 451 1217 5409 39 91 450 1213 5395
MKT, SMB, HML, MOM
0
8 316 1055 5503 0
8 316 1051 5483
Correlation (×100)
MKT
MKT, SMB, HML
MKT, SMB, HML, MOM

54 43
87 75
100 99

32

23
45
68

15
30
46

7
15
22

53 43
87 75
100 99

23
45
68

15
30
46

7
15
22

Table 9
Out-of-Sample Performance of Various Investment Strategies
Sample Sharpe ratios are computed for investment strategies corresponding to various prior beliefs about
pricing and skill. Prior mispricing uncertainty, σα , corresponds to the pricing model given in the same row.
Prior skill uncertainty (σδ ) as well as σα are reported in percent per year. All strategies are rebalanced
monthly and rely only on information available up to that month. The investment universe in any given
month consists of all no-load equity mutual funds with at least three years of return history. Every month,
the funds are sorted according to their sample Sharpe ratios over the last ten years (or less, if ten years of data
are not available), and the funds in the top decile are assigned “Þve diamonds.” The “Þve-diamond” strategy
buys an equally-weighted portfolio of all Þve-diamond funds. The hot-hand strategy buys an equally-weighted
portfolio of the top decile of funds ranked on their returns over the previous calendar year.

Investment strategy
CAPM, σα = 0, σδ = 0
CAPM, σα = 0, σδ = 2
CAPM, σα = 0, σδ = ∞
CAPM, σα = 2, σδ = 0
CAPM, σα = 2, σδ = 2
CAPM, σα = 2, σδ = ∞

0.46
0.56
0.66
0.48
0.54
0.65

0.25
0.28
0.57
0.25
0.31
0.56

0.69
0.81
0.74
0.69
0.75
0.72

0.46
0.45
0.61
0.48
0.44
0.60

0.44
0.38
0.54
0.43
0.38
0.53

0.48
0.52
0.67
0.53
0.50
0.66

No model, σα = ∞, σδ = 0
No model, σα = ∞, σδ = 2
No model, σα = ∞, σδ = ∞

0.48
0.42
0.58

0.38
0.35
0.52

0.57
0.48
0.63

Value-weighted market portfolio
“Five-diamond” strategy
Hot-hand strategy

0.65
0.66
0.63

0.45
0.60
0.50

0.91
0.77
0.80

Fama-French,
Fama-French,
Fama-French,
Fama-French,
Fama-French,
Fama-French,
4-factor,
4-factor,
4-factor,
4-factor,
4-factor,
4-factor,

σα
σα
σα
σα
σα
σα

σα
σα
σα
σα
σα
σα

= 0,
= 0,
= 0,
= 2,
= 2,
= 2,

= 0,
= 0,
= 0,
= 2,
= 2,
= 2,

σδ
σδ
σδ
σδ
σδ
σδ

σδ
σδ
σδ
σδ
σδ
σδ

Sample Sharpe ratio (annual)
Jan 79—Dec 98 Jan 79—Dec 88 Jan 89—Dec 98
0.66
0.31
0.93
0.51
0.07
0.87
0.66
0.53
0.77
0.52
0.30
0.68
0.53
0.18
0.82
0.64
0.54
0.73

=0
=2
=∞
=0
=2
=∞

=0
=2
=∞
=0
=2
=∞
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